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Researchers investigating the link between trade and peace often face a severe 
problem of list-wise deletion from missing trade data. Attempts to mitigate this 
problem include assuming that most observations are zero or imputing the values 
of such flows. We compare two frequently used trade data sets (the Gleditsch data 
set and the Correlates of War Project data set). We classify individual observations 
as observed, constructed or missing. We demonstrate that state attributes are 
systematically related to different categories of trade data. Using Monte Carlo 
simulations, we also find that replacing some missing data with estimated values tends 
to inflate the effects of trade in conflict models, although the effects differ by data set.
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Introduction
Research on trade interdependence and interstate conflict has become an important 
and active area of study. The findings to date, however, have been mixed. Divergent 
findings have been tied to differences in empirical estimation, variable construction, 
model specifications, and differences in trade data sets. Our study investigates how 
missing trade data and the methods to replace missing observations may influence 
the empirical findings that are at the heart of these debates. If trade data are missing 
completely at random, then this would be an ignorable problem for our estimates 
*We would like to thank Brian Pollins, John Oneal, Katherine Barbieri, Rafael Rueveny, 
Doug Block, and three anonymous reviewers for help and suggestions with this project. 
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the meetings of the Peace Science Society 
in 2005 (Iowa) and 2008 (Claremont).
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as long as we still have more observations than covariates.1 If, however, trade data, 
or data for any other independent variable, are missing systematically, then this 
can reduce statistical variance, lead to statistical insignificance in hypothesis testing 
and even bias estimates (Allison, 2002). Conflict scholars have found it necessary 
to reduce missing data by constructing trade data using a variety of techniques and 
decision-rules. But decisions to construct trade values are based on assumptions 
about what trade values would look like if we had excellent documentation combined 
with consistent collection techniques and coding rules. Examining the two most 
widely used trade data sets in international relations (Gleditsch, 2004, and Barbieri, 
Keshk, and Pollins, 2008; hereafter COW/BKP), we find that the assumptions one 
makes to replace missing data indeed appear to affect estimates of the effects of 
bilateral trade flows on interstate conflict.2
Debates over Trade Model Specification, Estimation, and Data
Studies examining the effects of trade on interstate conflict have produced divergent 
findings. Barbieri (1995, 1996, 2002) has argued that trade increases interstate conflict, 
while many other studies find supporting evidence for the “liberal peace” assertion 
that trade reduces the probability of such conflict (Oneal et al., 1996; Oneal and 
Russett, 1997, 1999a,b; Oneal et al., 2003; Russett and Oneal, 2001). Oneal (2003: 
724) suggests this debate is settled given the 30 or so studies by 25 different scholars 
providing evidence showing the pacifying effects of trade. Instead, debate has turned 
to matters of model specification, estimation, and data. Special attention has been 
paid to how to treat missing data and variable construction.
Some scholars have suggested these divergent findings are a function of 
potentially improper statistical analysis techniques. Beck et al. (1998) find that 
when using their “peace years” and splines technique, the effect of trade on 
conflict is statistically insignificant. Debate has also included the appropriateness 
of fixed effects estimators (Green et al., 2001; Oneal and Russett, 2001; Beck and 
Katz, 2001; King, 2001). Keshk et al. (2004, 2010) use simultaneous equations to 
examine the endogenous relationship between interstate trade and militarized 
conflict. They find evidence that conflict reduces trade but inconsistent evidence 
that trade flows in turn reduce militarized conflicts.
Other researchers speak to this debate by examining the different measures of 
trade used by Barbieri and Oneal and Russett. Gartzke and Li (2003a) distinguish 
among “trade share”, “trade dependence”, and “trade openness” and investigate 
their effects on militarized interstate dispute (MID) onset. Examining the 1950–1992 
time period, Gartzke and Li construct these measures from both the trade data 
sets of Barbieri (1998) and Oneal and Russett (1999a). Gartzke and Li’s findings, 
1 This is the concept of “micronumerosity”. See Gujarati (2003: ch. 10) for a discussion.
2 One reviewer expressed concern about the possibility of non-stationarity of trade data; 
however, investigating that issue and its impact on the findings to date regarding the trade–
conflict relationship would entail a large, separate project, and is not the focus of the research 
presented here.
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however, have not settled the substantive debate. Both Oneal (2003) and Barbieri 
and Peters (2003) take issue with Gartzke and Li’s conclusions. Gartzke and Li 
(2003b) find Oneal’s and Barbieri and Peters’s critiques unpersuasive. Hegre 
(2005a) also takes issue with Gartzke and Li’s (2003a,b) interpretation of their 
findings, focusing specifically on their assertion that while “trade share” measures a 
state’s disconnectedness from world trade, “trade dependence” captures a state’s 
connectedness to world trade. Hegre (2005a) is also concerned that Gartzke and 
Li’s trade openness measure may be masking the effects of the size of states’ 
economies. This debate remains unresolved, as Hegre (2005b) does not find Gartzke 
and Li’s (2005) response to his critiques sufficient or compelling.
Most relevant for our purposes is how the problem of missing data has been 
treated in past studies. Oneal and Russett code missing dyadic trade data from the 
IMF as zero, although neither the original Barbieri data set nor the Barbieri, 
Keshk, and Pollins3 data set (COW/BKP) follow this decision-rule. In an attempt 
to determine if these differences in the treatment of missing trade data have a 
substantive effect, Gartzke and Li construct two versions of Oneal and Russett’s 
data—the first with missing trade values coded as zero and the second with missing 
trade values coded as missing. Across these different data sets, Gartzke and Li find 
that while trade dependence and trade openness reduce the likelihood of MID 
onset, conversely, trade share increases the likelihood of MID onset. Gelpi and 
Grieco (2008) show that the effect of trade dependence, using trade data from 
both Oneal and Russett and the original Barbieri data set, appears contingent on 
the level of democracy of the potential initiator of interstate conflict and the trade 
dependence of the potential target.
Of primary importance for our purposes is Gelpi and Grieco’s imputation of 
missing values following King et al. (2001). Their results also lead them to suggest 
that Barbieri’s original finding that trade dependence increases militarized interstate 
disputes was based on a sample bias stemming from missing data. They also believe 
their imputation method is more accurate than treating all missing values as zero, as 
do Oneal and Russett in much of their work. Keshk et al. (2010) examine the 
robustness of different treatments for missing data in their study by dropping 
observations where IMF data equaled zero or replacing them with a nominal value. 
The results were congruent with their 2004 study that international relations appears 
to drive trade flows and not the reverse. Another study is of additional note here 
concerning research design. Gartzke (2007) argues that the liberal peace should be 
interpreted as a “capitalist peace”. He provides evidence that peace is a function of 
financial openness and level of development, washing out the effects of democracy 
and trade. However, his incorporation of three economic variables (trade flows, 
financial data, and GDP) appears to compound the problem of list-wise deletion. It 
is thus not unreasonable to suspect that his results are at least in part a function of 
sample bias if missing data are missing systematically (Dafoe, 2008).
The findings of all the studies above are affected not only by important 
assumptions regarding variable construction but also by the quality of data 
3 The BKP data are available through the Correlates of War Project. Others refer to these 
data as the Correlates of War Project trade data.
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employed. Are we drawing accurate and reliable inferences in regard to both the 
direction and substantive effects of trade on conflict? Our primary goal here is 
to analyze the effects of missing data and their implications on the trade–conflict 
relationship, suspecting that missing data are masking our ability to discern 
patterns of theoretical interest. This is an important step towards understanding 
the reasons for the discrepant findings discussed above.
Categorizing Types of Trade Data
Anyone that has collected or scrutinized trade data is keenly aware of the thorny 
problems relating to sources and missing data. Those that have collected and refined 
trade data should be applauded for their efforts, but in doing so they have constructed 
trade data to replace missing trade figures. We categorize three types of trade data 
in the Gleditsch and Correlates of War (BKP) trade data sets. There are observed 
trade figures. These figures are taken from various official sources. There are con-
structed trade figures. These figures are generated based on various assumptions, 
whether explicit or implicit, by Gleditsch and COW/BKP. To be clear, we classify as 
constructed any trade figure that is the result of using any procedure to replace a 
missing trade data observation.4 Finally, some data are missing.5 Table 1 displays the 
three-way categorization of trade data for the Gleditsch and COW/BKP trade data.
This leads us to ask three questions about these trade figures. First, do the 
characteristics of states vary with the type of trade data? That is, are states with 
observed trade data systematically different from states with constructed trade data 
and/or from states with missing trade data? If so, then decisions about including and 
excluding cases based on the type of trade data may have an effect on one’s analyses 
and results. Gleditsch himself notes that trade data are not missing at random; for 
example he says “…bilateral trade flow data tend to be poor—if at all available—
for smaller, developing countries that are far apart or pairs of antagonistic states” 
(Gleditsch, 2002: 712). Barbieri (2002) agrees there appears to be a systematic 
pattern to the missing data. Not that this is not just a potential problem for trade 
data but a problem for all economic variables studied using time-series cross-
sectional (TSCS) research designs. Naturally, the farther one goes back in time the 
more one should expect economic data to be missing for states.
Second, are missing exports and imports data distributed similarly? One would 
think that missing exports and imports data in bilateral observations would square 
4 We adopt a very strict definition of ‘constructed’. Anytime a researcher replaces a missing 
trade data figure, we call this constructed. This includes the following: if A’s imports from 
B are missing, but there is a recorded figure for B’s exports to A and that figure is used to 
replace the missing import figure, we call this constructed. Other researchers may feel that 
since the missing data is being replaced by a recorded figure, this is not constructed data. 
We acknowledge this to be a reasonable position, but we prefer to use our strict definition.
5 The Gleditsch data observation codes are listed in the file readme_4.1.asc, which is part of 
the .zip file that can be downloaded at http://weber.ucsd.edu/~kgledits/exptradegdp.html. 
The missing data codes for the COW/BKP data set are available in their Correlates of War 
Project Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 2.01 (http://correlatesofwar.org).
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with each other; however, this is rarely the case. Instead, the values of imports and 
exports often do not match, or some observations are missing. There may be many 
reasons for this problem, ranging from mundane issues with historical records and 
references to the more interesting and politically motivated intentional misreporting 
strategies. See Barbieri et al. (2009) for a detailed discussion of this issue. We 
do not offer any thorough explanation of this problem; instead we explore how 
significant a problem this is overall.
Third, if we replace missing trade data with constructed trade data, does this alter 
the results of trade–conflict analyses (or any other relationship for that matter), 
and if so, in what ways? Gleditsch also provides some insight into this question in 
his article. He studies the influence of dyadic economic dependence and distance 
on the likelihood of a militarized interstate dispute, comparing results using only 
observed trade data with results using observed and estimated trade data. He finds 
that the substantive effect of trade was higher in the more complete sample (with 
missing data replaced) relative to the observed sample, in part related to conflicts 
that were systematically missing such as those between countries in the Eastern 
Bloc. We later use Monte Carlo simulations of both the COW/BKP and Gleditsch 
data sets to demonstrate how our model estimates of militarized conflicts vary as 
constructed trade data replace missing trade data.
The Gleditsch Trade Data
The Gleditsch trade data covers the years 1948–2000. The trade data are scaled 
in millions of current US dollars, and the unit of analysis is the dyad-year. Each 
record contains four trade figures for the dyad A–B: exports of State A to State 
B, imports of State A from State B, exports of State B to State A, and imports of 
State B from State A. The bulk of the observed trade data originates from the IMF 
Direction of Trade Data. A smaller amount of observed trade is taken from other 
official sources. The manner in which Gleditsch estimates trade data is described 
in both his published article (Gleditsch, 2002: 716–718) and in the documentation 
file for the data set. For our purposes, we consider observed trade data to be those 
data Gleditsch obtained from the IMF Direction of Trade Data and his other cited 
sources (i.e. data categories 0, 1, 1.1, and 1.2). Constructed data are those data he 
designates as “estimated” in his documentation and the data set itself. The sources 
for Gleditsch’s trade data (and their categorization as observed or constructed) 
are given in Table 1.
As can be seen in Table 1, Gleditsch uses a variety of techniques to construct 
trade data. If an import figure is missing, but the corresponding export figure is 
available (i.e. if A’s imports from B is missing, but B’s exports to A is available), the 
export figure replaces the missing import figure and vice versa (substitute available 
import data for missing export data). He uses interpolation to replace missing 
trade data. He also uses lags and leads to cover ranges of missing data. Finally, in a 
number of cases he codes a value of zero if his research indicated that it is unlikely 
there was any trade between states. There are no missing data in the Gleditsch 
trade data set. More information on his trade data is available in Gleditsch (2002), 
especially pp. 716–718.
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The Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins (COW/BKP) Trade Data
The Correlates of War Trade Data Set, version 2.01, covers the years 1870–2006 in 
both monadic and dyadic forms. Two trade flows are measured: the imports from 
state A to state B (flow1), and the imports from state B to state A (flow2). Trade 
flows are measured in current millions of US dollars (Barbieri et al., 2008). The 
most obvious difference between the COW/BKP data set and the Gleditsch data 
set is the temporal domain. But a far more significant difference is the treatment of 
missing data in the two data sets.
As we noted, Gleditsch replaces all missing trade data with constructed data. 
BKP are far more conservative in their approach to missing trade data, but they 
do create some constructed trade data. They often rely on using the imports from 
one state to replace exports in their trade partner, which they reason minimizes 
the chance of error in the data because states are more likely to misrepresent or 
misreport exports than imports. When only one figure is available for an import/
export pair, the available figure is substituted for the missing data figure. Finally, 
missing data and zero values for IMF trade data were replaced by values from 
Barbieri’s (1998) trade data set. But they do not replace missing trade data with 
zeros (see Barbieri et al., 2009, for a discussion of their reasoning). They also argue 
against interpolating or extrapolating trade data.
Due to the longer time period of the BKP data set, they have more observed 
trade data observations than Gleditsch. But they also have a significant amount of 
missing data. About 30 percent of their trade data are missing. We want to stress 
that the amount of missing data in their data set is a deliberate decision by BKP. 
They have a very different attitude than Gleditsch on what techniques are 
appropriate to create constructed trade data.
Predicting Categories of Trade Data by State Characteristics
Are states with observed trade data, constructed trade data, and missing trade data 
different? Can we associate each of our three categories of trade figures with state 
characteristics? The authors of the trade data sets both expect that, as would be 
commonly anticipated by others who have worked with time-series cross-sectional 
(TSCS) economic data, some data are missing systematically, although there has 
been little empirical investigation of this point. For example, Mansfield et al. (2000: 
317) note that they encountered problems collecting trade data for some autocra-
cies that bias their empirical results in a manner that “understates” their findings. 
This is consistent with the expectations by Allison (2002). However, few if any past 
studies have documented how state characteristics are related to all three of our 
trade categories (observed, constructed, and missing). If this is the case, then it is 
possible the results we obtain by using only observed trade data are not representa-
tive of what we would obtain if there were no missing trade data. A problem may 
occur using list-wise deletion if data are missing systematically, resulting in higher 
standard errors and thus inaccurate test statistics (Allison, 2002: 6). We begin to 
answer this question by seeking to characterize the differences between states that 
have observed trade data figures, states that have trade data figures constructed by 
Gleditsch or BKP, and states that have missing trade data figures. To maximize the 
comparability of the results, we analyze both trade data sets from 1948 on.
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We selected a series of state characteristics we felt would provide a good 
prediction of missing trade figures. Some have a prominent place in analysis of the 
democracy–trade–conflict literature. Others have a prominent place in the study 
of comparative foreign policy. This is by no means an exhaustive list of potential 
variables that may affect the availability of trade data. Not included in the list 
below is a variable for participation in militarized interstate disputes or wars. 
We agree that some trade flows are disrupted by conflict or trade figures are not 
recorded during conflicts. Because interstate conflict is a function of other state 
and bilateral characteristics, we do not include it here and instead refer readers to 
Barbieri et al. (2009) for evidence to this effect. Because it should be acknowledged 
that data are more difficult to obtain in the distant past, “time” is another variable 
we do not explore in our analysis, although we expect that trade figures are more 
available going back in time for states which vary positively with the variables 
below. The state characteristics we selected below were extracted using EUGene 
(Bennett and Stam, 2000):6
•	 the level of democracy
•	 the size of the economy (operationalized as commercial energy consumption)
•	 the level of development (operationalized as commercial energy consumption 
per capita)
•	 the Correlates of War Project power capability score (i.e. CINC score)
•	 major power status
•	 region
The case structure for this analysis uses all non-directed dyads. Each of the first 
four state characteristics above serves as a separate dependent variable in a regres-
sion equation. Because each dependent variable is a continuous measure, we use 
OLS regression but omit the constant. We also show using contingency tables how 
observed, constructed, and missing data are distributed by major power status and 
region for each of the Gleditsch and BKP data sets. We present these latter results 
in the appendix. (See Appendix Tables A1, A2, and A3.) In each regression equation 
we include three binary independent variables, one for each of our categories of 
trade data: Observed, Constructed, and Missing. This results in 12 total trade dummy 
6 The democracy score, dem, was generated by subtracting the Polity IV autocracy score 
from the Polity IV democracy score for a state. Note that in the generation of his trade data, 
Gleditsch used the list of states from Gleditsch and Ward (1999). This list contains more entities 
(and/or has entities with a longer period of years) than exist in the Correlates of War Project 
state list. Consequently, there are a number of state-years in the Gleditsch trade data for 
which we do not have data from EUGene. Our use of energy consumption as an indicator of 
the size of the economy (as opposed to using GDP data) and energy consumption per capita 
as an indicator of development (as opposed to GDP per capita) is consistent with a great 
deal of previous research in international relations. But there is another reason we choose 
to use energy consumption instead of GDP. Just like trade data, some GDP data are from 
official sources, some are constructed, and some are missing. Given that the purpose of this 
study is to explore the implications of varying the amount of constructed trade data (versus 
missing data), we felt that adding another variable with the same issues would only serve to 
complicate (and possibly obscure) the focus of our study.
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variables, three each for the Gleditsch export data, the Gleditsch import data, the 
BKP flow1 data, and the BKP flow2 data. Please see the appendix for the structure 
of the case records and how we convert the dyadic records to state-level records. 
We provide one model specification below from our analysis to illustrate what the 
models look like:
Democracy = Imports_observed + Imports_constructed + Imports_missing + e
Tables 2 (the Gleditsch data) and 3 (the COW/BKP data) summarize the results 
of the regression analysis of the continuous state characteristics. The full estimates 
of these models are available from the authors upon request. Given the large 
number of observations (over one million), we would expect all coefficients to be 
statistically significant. This indeed is the case so the tables only show the regression 
coefficients. The dependent variables for each model are listed in the columns and 
the slope coefficients for each trade dummy independent variable fill the cells.
In terms of the Gleditsch data, there is a consistent ordering by trade data. 
States with observed trade data are on average more democratic, have a higher 
level of energy consumption, a higher level of energy consumption per capita, and 
higher CINC scores. The slope coefficents for the observed Gleditsch import and 
export data are always higher than those for the constructed and missing 
categories. States with constructed data score lower on all these variables. States 
with missing trade data have the lowest values on all of these variables. Thus, these 
states are the least democratic, have the smallest economies, and are the least 
developed and least powerful. Also of interest is the sign change on the level of 
democracy variable as we move from observed data (positive) to estimated or 
Table 2. Regression Slope Coefficients for Continuous State Characteristics Gleditsch Data
Export Data: State Characteristic Import Data: State Characteristic
Dem Energy
Energy Per 
Capita CINC Dem Energy
Energy Per 
Capita CINC
Observed 0.996 86418.8 2.913 0.010 1.545 86532.5 3.007 0.009
Constructed -1.675 34934.8 2.539 0.004 -1.775 45352.9 2.496 0.007
Missing -2.111 18632.6 2.094 0.002 -2.111 18632.6 2.094 0.002
Table 3. Regression Slope Coefficients for Continuous State Characteristics 
COW/BKP Data
 Flow 1: State Characteristic Flow 2: State Characteristic
 Dem Energy
Energy Per 
Capita CINC Dem Energy
Energy Per 
Capita CINC
Observed 2.120 97972.0 2.849 0.009 1.646 106248 2.952 0.010
Constructed -1.881 77133.0 2.580 0.010 1.300 60669 2.369 0.007
Missing -1.630 31024.9 1.838 0.004 -1.744 24488 1.712 0.003
 at RICE UNIV on May 2, 2013cmp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Conflict Management and Peace Science 28(2)
154
missing data (negative). Moving from observed data to estimated or missing data, 
there are large magnitude changes in the size of both the economy variable and 
the power capability variable.
In terms of the COW/BKP data, missing data are still associated with less 
democratic states, smaller economies, less developed states, and less powerful states. 
Again, we observe a sign change for democracy as we move from observed flow1 
data to estimated or missing flow1 data—but only when we change from observed 
flow2 data to missing flow2 data. The sign change is not in effect for flow2 estimated 
data. As with the Gleditsch trade data, there are large magnitude changes in the size 
of the economy and power capability as we move from observed to missing or 
constructed data. Of particular interest is a large change in magnitude for the level 
of development when using the COW/BKP data. This is a factor that may likely 
affect the sample of states included and thus likely trade–conflict estimates.
Is this important? Possibly. Replacing missing trade data with constructed 
figures changes the mix of state characteristics in one’s sample. This in turn may 
change the estimated relationships in one’s analysis. The variance for trade 
variables in a sample that contains only observed trade data should be artificially 
low when missing trade figures are missing systematically due to their dependence 
on the values of other independent variables. Allison notes that such data are 
not missing at random (MAR), and under such conditions, regression estimates 
that treat missing data by list-wise deletion inflate standard errors. This could 
render slope coefficients statistically insignificant. Interestingly, list-wise deletion 
combined with logistic regression can still yield robust and accurate estimation as 
long as “the probability of missing data on any variable depends on the dependent 
variable but does not depend on any of the independent variables” (Allison, 2002: 7). 
Our analysis shows this is not the case; missing trade data can be predicted based 
on the values of other independent variables often accompanying a trade variable. 
Hence, estimates of interstate conflict may not be very reliable from sample to 
sample and with changes in model specifications due, in part, to list-wise deletion, 
which is magnified for dyadic studies because if either state in a dyad is missing 
trade data this observation will drop out of the estimation. Another implication 
is that dyadic studies will be missing proportionally more observations than state-
level analyses if using only observed data. Again, much of this depends on the 
sample one begins with and then methods used to fill in missing data but also 
depends on both theory and trade measures.
However, both the BKP and Gleditsch data sets include constructed trade figures, 
and this makes it less clear how much the problem of list-wise deletion affects 
estimates of interstate conflict or other dependent variables. Adding back some 
constructed trade figures could improve the variance of trade variables that reduces 
non-random sampling error. In regard to the method used by Gleditsch, we offer no 
critique here but instead focus on understanding the data. BKP (2009), however, 
demonstrate how the balanced trade relationship assumption could yield artificial 
symmetry in the aggregrated trade variables. Our analysis also shows that there are 
differences between exports and imports or flows that point to a lack of symmetry 
in trade data. Although incorporating constructed trade figures could improve the 
efficiency of estimation, there is little theory to guide us about what particular 
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method of construction should be used on which particular missing observations. If 
imputation and other methods are used, there is an increased risk of increasing error 
because we often do not have very good theoretical understanding about why data 
are missing. Our next section provides a test to see how the inclusion of constructed 
trade figures affects estimates of militarized interstate conflicts.
Constructed Trade Data and its Effects on the Estimation of 
Militarized Conflict
Here we seek to extend our understanding of the impact of the choices made in 
constructing trade data sets on our substantive understanding of the trade–conflict 
relationship. Specifically, how do differences among “observed”, “constructed”, 
and “missing” trade data affect the trade–conflict relationship? We now turn to 
an examination of the influence of using trade data estimates on the relationship 
between trade dependence and conflict. This is a rather important topic methodologi-
cally because it strikes at the heart of assumptions in our research designs. Allison 
(2002) says of imputation, “the basic idea is to substitute some reasonable guess for 
each missing value and then proceed to do the analysis as if there were no missing 
data” (p. 11). He goes on to describe several methods that may be used to impute 
data and under what conditions. Imputation is particularly more complicated when 
data are missing in more than one independent variable, which based on the results 
shown in the previous section would appear to be a risk for our models of trade and 
interstate conflict. In terms of the various methods available, Allison warns us that 
“unfortunately, all of these imputation methods suffer from a fundamental problem: 
Analyzing imputed data as though it were complete data produces standard errors 
that are underestimated and test statistics that are overestimated. Conventional ana-
lytic methods simply do not adjust for the fact that the imputation process involves 
uncertainty about the missing values” (Allison, 2002: 12).
Gleditsch demonstrates this effect in his own data in a simple analysis (2002: 720). 
Using the dyad-year design, he predicts the onset of militarized interstate disputes 
from a logit analysis using trade dependence and the natural log of distance 
between the capital cities of the dyad. His results are included in our appendix 
(see Appendix Table A4). He shows that the trade dependence is about 50% larger 
and that there are of course many more cases in the model with imputed data. We 
want to conduct a more thorough examination of the impact of replacing missing 
trade data with estimated trade data. We place the trade data in the context of a full 
model predicting conflict by varying the amount of estimated trade data so that we 
can track the impact of replacing missing data with trade data estimates. We base 
our Monte Carlo work on the analysis of Russett and Oneal (2001).7
We wanted to base our study on published research that found a significant 
relationship between trade dependence and conflict. There are a number of 
different pieces we could have used, and our choice of this particular set of results 
was somewhat arbitrary. On the other hand, Russett and Oneal’s body of work is 
7 The Stata command used to replicate these results is: xtgee dispute1 smldmat smldep smigo-
abi lcaprat allies noncontg logdstab minrpwrs, family(binomial) link(logit) corr(ar1) force 
robust nolog.
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widely known and their book Triangulating Peace is widely cited.8 So most 
researchers interested in the impact of interdependence on conflict will be familiar 
with their results.
We begin by “replicating” this analysis for both sets of trade data.9 We use the 
Russett and Oneal data from their book, except that we alter the lower dependence 
variable. This variable is created in two steps. First, for each state in a dyad, the ratio 
of its total trade with the other state to the state’s GDP is calculated. Second, the 
lower of these two ratios is used in the analysis. In our analysis, we create two series 
of lower dependence variables, one using Gleditsch’s trade data and the other 
using the COW/BKP trade data. For our variables, we use Gleditsch’s GDP data 
for the denominator of our indexes.
We start by using only the observed trade data from each data set. These 
analyses have the maximum amount of missing trade data from each data set. The 
results of the analysis using each trade data set are shown in Table 4. We then 
“replicate” this analysis including all observed and constructed data from each 
trade data set. These analyses minimize the missing data and the results are also 
shown in Table 5.
In terms of the Gleditsch data results shown in Tables 4 and 5, our interest is in 
the coefficient for lower trade dependence. First, when only observed data are used, 
lower trade dependence is statistically insignificant. One reason for this may be a 
reduction in the variance of trade as the variable becomes more homogenous due 
to missing data. Restricted variance in a right-hand side variable is one reason for 
insignificant regression coefficients (Lewis-Beck, 1980: 35). We should expect this if 
trade data are more likely to be missing for some types of state compared to others, 
as we demonstrated above. In contrast, when both observed and constructed trade 
data are included, lower trade dependence is negative and statistically significant. 
Moreover, as we move from observed to observed plus constructed Gleditsch trade 
data, the size (absolute value) of the lower trade dependence coefficient doubles. In 
contrast, when we examine the COW/BKP data, we find that for both the observed 
and observed plus constructed trade data, the lower trade dependence coefficient is 
negative and statistically significant. The magnitude of change from observed trade 
data (–37.974) to observed plus construced trade data (–60.197) is about 1.5.
We would like to provide a more explicit characterization of the impact of 
replacing missing data with constructed data. A Monte Carlo study varying the 
amount of constructed data is an appropriate way to assess the impact of varying 
amounts of constructed data on substantive findings. Our Monte Carlo study is 
conducted as follows. Beginning with only the observed trade data (i.e. the data 
8 A search in Google Scholar turns up over 700 citations to the book (search conducted 24 
September 2009).
9 It should be noted that in their analysis, Russett and Oneal do not use the Gleditsch or 
COW/BKP trade data. They begin with IMF trade data. They supplement these data with 
Barbieri’s (1998) trade data, replacing missing data with her figures when possible. Finally, 
because members of the IMF are required to report their trade if either state in a dyad is a 
member of the IMF, if there was no entry for their trade, Russett and Oneal substituted a 
value of zero (Russett and Oneal, 2001: 139).
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used to generate the results of Table 4), we randomly add increments of 5% of 
constructed data (i.e. we first replace 5% of the missing data with constructed data, 
then replace 10% of the missing data with constructed data, etc.) until we reach 
95% of missing data replaced. For each level adding constructed data, we do 200 
replications and average the coefficient, standard error, z-score, and probability for 
the lower trade dependence variable. Table 6 shows the results of the Monte Carlo 
simulation for the Gleditsch trade data on the lower trade dependence variable, 
and Table 7 shows the results for the COW/BKP trade data. The average coefficient 
values for the Gleditsch data are graphed in Figure 1 and the coefficient values for 
the COW/BKP data are graphed in Figure 2.
Table 4. Russett and Oneal Table A5.1 Using Gleditsch and COW/BKP Trade 
Data: Observed Data Only
 Gleditsch Observed Trade Data COW-BKP Observed Data
MID Onset Coef. Std. Err.  P>|z| Coef. Std. Err. P>|z|
Lower democracy -0.051 0.015 0.000 -0.043 0.010 0.000
Lower dependence -41.20 33.10 0.213 -37.974 16.601 0.022
Int’l organizations 0.001 0.006 0.814 -0.010 0.004 0.023
Log of power ratio -0.080 0.072 0.269 -0.278 0.059 0.000
Allies -0.462 0.281 0.100 -0.275 0.204 0.177
Non-contiguity -1.330 0.289 0.000 -1.165 0.169 0.000
Log of distance -0.265 0.092 0.004 -0.287 0.070 0.000
Only minor powers 0.269 0.299 0.369 -0.285 0.214 0.182
Constant -1.941 0.783 0.013 -1.098 0.562 0.051
GEE population-averaged model      
Number of groups 790 1,000
N 16,587 25,776
Table 5. Russett and Oneal Table A5.1 Using Gleditsch and COW/BKP Trade 
Data: Observed and Constructed Data
Gleditsch Observed + 
Constructed
COW-BKP Observed + 
Constructed
MID Onset Coef. Std. Err. P >|z| Coef. Std. Err. P>|z|
Lower democracy -0.046 0.013 0.001 -0.058 0.011 0.000
Lower dependence -84.8 40.8 0.038 -60.2 20.562 0.000
Int’l organizations -0.024 0.007 0.000 -0.011 0.005 0.023
Log of power ratio -0.366 0.063 0.000 -0.327 0.056 0.000
Allies -0.784 0.211 0.000 -0.536 0.188 0.004
Non-contiguity -1.252 0.258 0.000 -1.104 0.197 0.000
Log of distance -0.450 0.084 0.000 -0.325 0.077 0.000
Only minor powers -0.874 0.274 0.001 -0.596 0.212 0.005
Constant 0.871 0.721 0.227 -0.618 0.652 0.343
GEE population-averaged model       
Number of groups 944 1,060
N 28,177 33,809
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Table 7. Lower Dependence Values from Monte Carlo Runs: COW/BKP Data
Percentage Missing 
Data Replaced
Average Value for Lower Dependency
Coefficient Std. Err. Z-score Prob.
 5 -38.489 16.538 -2.326 0.020
10 -38.071 16.145 -2.355 0.019
15 -38.517 15.990 -2.405 0.017
20 -37.872 15.572 -2.427 0.016
25 -37.631 15.286 -2.457 0.015
30 -37.217 15.043 -2.468 0.014
35 -37.910 14.995 -2.522 0.012
40 -37.724 14.801 -2.542 0.012
45 -37.972 14.774 -2.562 0.011
50 -37.804 14.715 -2.560 0.012
55 -38.160 14.680 -2.587 0.011
60 -39.373 14.820 -2.646 0.009
65 -38.964 14.748 -2.629 0.010
70 -39.309 14.793 -2.648 0.009
75 -41.951 15.524 -2.689 0.009
80 -43.668 15.900 -2.734 0.007
85 -45.081 16.254 -2.763 0.007
90 -48.337 17.168 -2.803 0.006
95 -54.591 18.850 -2.891 0.004
Table 6. Lower Dependence Values from Monte Carlo Runs: Gleditsch Data
Percentage Missing 
Data Replaced
Average Value for Lower Dependency
Coefficient Std. Err. Z-score Prob.
 5 -38.125 29.641 -1.282 0.201
10 -37.971 27.960 -1.351 0.177
15 -36.983 26.133 -1.406 0.161
20 -37.246 25.263 -1.464 0.144
25 -36.474 24.101 -1.501 0.135
30 -36.944 23.629 -1.550 0.122
35 -36.176 22.669 -1.580 0.116
40 -36.163 22.175 -1.612 0.109
45 -37.105 22.260 -1.646 0.102
50 -35.946 21.276 -1.662 0.099
55 -36.795 21.561 -1.675 0.098
60 -39.361 22.450 -1.712 0.091
65 -41.082 22.955 -1.752 0.084
70 -42.826 23.834 -1.752 0.084
75 -44.811 24.640 -1.772 0.081
80 -54.039 28.814 -1.822 0.074
85 -56.675 29.920 -1.841 0.072
90 -67.943 34.511 -1.928 0.059
95 -78.144 38.428 -2.019 0.046
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The overall pattern in both Tables 6 and 7 is that the coefficient values for lower 
trade dependence gradually get more negative as the amount of estimated trade 
data increases. Still, note that whereas the probability value does not reach the .05 
level until 95% of the missing trade data are replaced with Gleditsch’s estimates, 
lower trade dependence is statistically significant for all levels of estimated 
COW/BKP data. We see what Allison (2002: 12) says typically occurs with 
imputed (constructed) data. A slope coefficent will tend to become overestimated. 
Standard errors are often underestimated using a variety of imputation techniques. 
Figures 1 (Gleditsch) and 2 (COW/BKP) provide a visual display of how the 
coefficient values change as the proportion of missing data replaced by estimates 
is increased. As Figure 1 shows, using the Gleditsch data, there is little change in 
the average value of the lower dependency coefficient from 5% to about 75%. At 
that point the absolute value of the coefficient begins to increase rapidly until at 
95% of missing values replaced, the coefficient is about twice the size of the 
coefficient with 5% of missing values replaced. The Monte Carlo study shows that 
replacing missing trade data with estimates can have a significant effect in both 
the substantive and statistical sense. However, the Monte Carlo study also 
suggests that this only happens at the extremes. The same general pattern occurs 
with the coefficients from the Monte Carlo analysis of the COW/BKP data. But 
as you can see in Figure 2, the increase in coefficient value as missing data is 
replaced is smaller.
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Figure 1. Gleditsch Average Lower Dependency Coefficient by Percentage of Missing 
Data Replaced
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Conclusions
Our study has demonstrated that when we consider differences in findings about 
the role that trade dependence plays in the onset of conflict, we need to take the 
manner in which trade data are generated into account. We feel it is useful to other 
scholars to see an explicit characterization of the influence of changing the manner 
in which missing trade data are treated. Taking a step back from our analysis, we 
see an interesting picture. States with constructed trade figures are less democratic, 
have lower power capability, and are less developed than those states with observed 
trade data. These states are thus very different on a set of characteristics we know 
are important predictors in the international relations literature.10 Moreover, there 
were differences in how export and import covaried with the state characteristics 
we examined. But when we start to include these states with different characteristics 
(by replacing missing trade data with Gleditsch’s constructed trade data), does this 
have an impact on the relationship between trade dependence and the onset of 
MIDs? Our conclusion is that it does not change the relationship until a very large 
proportion of the missing trade data are replaced by estimates. Again, in contrast, 
10 With the exception of region, the state characteristics we use strongly echo the three dichoto-
mies used in Rosenau’s classic “Pre-theories” article (Rosenau, 1966). The relative importance 
of variables in predicting foreign policy behavior is different depending on whether (a) the 
state has an open or closed political system, (b) the state is large or small, and (c) the state 
is developed or developing.
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when the COW/BKP data are employed, we see that the model estimates may be 
inflated but not as substantially—and are always statistically significant.
Our analysis of the Gleditsch and COW/BKP data leads us to conclude that 
replacing missing data with constructed data makes a difference, and the difference 
appears to be more than simply the impact of increasing the number of cases being 
analyzed (and its subsequent impact on the statistical significance of coefficients). 
Different types of states have different chances of having observed, constructed, 
and missing trade data. This raises the possibility that one’s decisions on missing 
trade data will not only affect the relationship between trade and conflict, but may 
affect other relationships as well. Clearly, the problem of list-wise deletion can be 
quite severe, especially in regard to economic data where some data sources can 
be unreliable and when the same states that are prone to missing trade data are 
similarly missing on other covariates.
This leads to a predictable question. Which trade data set is better? The answer 
to that question could not and should not be stated in an absolute manner because 
it depends on one’s research question. Our goal is not to decide which one of 
these data sets is “better” than the other. We think that is neither possible nor 
appropriate; however, we believe our efforts will help researchers to use the trade 
data that are more appropriate for the questions they wish to ask. We also do not 
believe that differences in findings in this field of research can be attributed solely 
to the manner in which different researchers have treated missing trade data. 
Recent studies clearly show that other decisions—decisions about indicators, time 
frames, and techniques of analysis—matter. We do believe, however, that decisions 
about missing trade data also have consequences, and we urge our colleagues to 
take these differences into consideration when contemplating which trade data 
to employ. Each of these data sets is still likely to contain observations that could 
be corrected, as is the case with most data sets. With that said, we implore, as others 
have done in the past, scholars to know their data.
It is reasonable and beneficial that some trade data are built so as to reduce 
some potential sample bias and increase estimation efficiency in our studies of 
interstate conflict. The problem of missing trade data will vary with differences in 
samples and for what purposes they are used. If one were to use trade data as 
control variables, then perhaps this issue would be slightly less important. If one 
is going to study trade in particular, then it would pay to make informed choices 
based on what types of estimated data one finds acceptable. For example, when 
trade data are missing for one state in a dyad, filling in the missing data could 
produce systematic error such as providing artificially higher levels of symmetry in 
trade asymmetry variables. Perhaps this is a bit of a test for risk acceptant versus 
risk adverse behavior, but it does come down to calculating how much potential 
error one is willing to inject into one’s study through the adoption of assumptions 
underlying imputation methods versus potentially constrained variance for trade 
dependence and sample bias. However, the magnitude of this problem will vary 
from study to study because the negative implications of missing trade data are 
like multicollinearity in that it is a sample specific loss of information problem for 
statistical estimation.
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Appendix
Case Structures for Trade Figures and State Characteristics Analysis
Gleditsch Trade Data
The first case structure to be analyzed is derived from Gleditsch’s “expdata.asc” 
trade data set. As noted above, each case in that data set is a non-directed dyad 
with multiple trade data entries. The relevant data for each record is as follows 
(note: this is not the exact format, but is rearranged and other variables omitted to 
simplify discussion):
Year StateA Aexport_toB Aimport_fromB StateB Bexport_toA Bimport_fromA
The second case structure to be analyzed is the COW/BKP data, which includes 
variables measuring the flow of imports between states A and B:
Year StateA Flow1(imports of A from B) StateB Flow2(imports of B from A)
There is an additional record for state A with every other state in the Gleditsch-
Ward system in that year. We need to organize these data so that we can conduct 
our analysis.
First, for the analysis of state characteristics, we do not use trade figures. We 
instead use the associated variable for each trade figure that indicates whether 
the trade figure is observed, constructed, or missing. We then take each dyadic 
record (such as the one in the example above) and convert it into two state-level 
records:
Year StateA Aexport_toB Aimport_fromB Otherstate (this is StateB)
Year StateB Bexport_toA Bimport_fromA Otherstate (this is StateA)
We then add the set of dummy variables for the type of trade data to each record 
(note since there are both import and export trade data on a single record, there is 
a set of three dummies for each trade figure).
The COW/BKP Data
Analogously, the set-up for the BKP data is:
Year StateA Flow1 Otherstate (this is StateB)
Year StateB Flow2 Otherstate (this is StateA)
We then add the state characteristics data to each record. For the first record in the 
above example, the state characteristics are for State A, and for the second record, 
the state characteristics are for State B. For analyses of state characteristics that are 
continuous, such as democracy or CINC, we create three dummy variables, one for 
each category of trade figure. We then regress the state characteristic on the three 
dummy variables (omitting the constant). For the rest of the state characteristics, 
we report contingency tables, comparing the three-way characterization of the type 
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of trade data with the state characteristic. Note that we conduct different analyses 
for each state’s trade export data and its import data and, analogously, for its Flow 
1 and Flow 2 data.
Table A1. Contingency Table Results for Analysis of Major Powers
Major Power vs. Export Data Type
Export Data Center
Major Power Missing Constructed Observed Total
No 222,960 303,361 535,922 1,062,243
99.25% 98.52% 94.13%
Yes 1,675 4,548 33,393 39,616
0.75% 1.48% 5.87%
Total 224,635 307,909 569,315 1,101,859
 Major Power vs. Source1 Data Type  
 Source1 Data Type  
Major Power Missing Constructed Observed Total
No 291,655 92,853 562,727 947,235
98.47% 95.15% 93.51%
Yes 4,545 4,738 39,054 48,337
1.53% 4.85% 6.49%
Total 296,200 97,591 601,781 995,572
 Major Power vs. Import Data Type  
 Import Data Type  
Major Power Missing Constructed Observed Total
No 222,960 375,357 463,926 1,062,243
99.25% 97.12% 94.53%
Yes 1,675 11,113 26,828 39,616
0.75% 2.88% 5.43%
Total 224,635 386,410 490,754 1,101,859
 Major Power vs. Source2 Data Type  
 Source2 Data Type  
Major Power Missing Constructed Observed Total
No 296,837 116,847 533,551 947,235
98.78% 95.62% 93.14%
Yes 3,681 5,353 39,303 48,337
1.22% 4.38% 6.86%
Total 300,518 122,200 572,854 995,572
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Table A3. Trade Data Type by Region: COW/BKP Data
 Export Data Type  
Region Missing Constructed Observed Total
Europe 62,190 29,204 206,272 297,666
20.89% 9.81% 69.30%
Middle East 18,248 7,283 40,795 66,326
27.51% 10.98% 61.51%
Africa 87,256 26,082 112,779 226,117
38.59% 11.53% 49.88%
Asia 13,873 4,998 19,425 38,296
36.23% 13.05% 50.72%
Americas 114,633 30,024 222,510 367,167
31.22% 8.18% 60.60%
Total 296,200 97,591 601,781 995,572
29.75% 9.80% 60.45%
Table A2. Trade Data Type by Region: Gleditsch Data
 Export Data Type  
Region Missing Constructed Observed Total
Europe 29,011 44,345 170,222 243,578
11.91% 18.21% 69.88%
Middle East 20,869 45,321 72,354 138,544
15.06% 32.71% 52.22%
Africa 79,543 98,360 98,750 276,473
28.77% 35.58% 35.65%
Asia 50,463 53,419 112,366 216,248
23.34% 24.70% 51.96%
Americas 44,749 66,464 115,803 227,016
19.71% 29.28% 51.01%
Total 224,635 307,909 569,315 1,101,859
20.39% 27.94% 51.67%
 Import Data Type
Region Missing Constructed Observed Total
Europe 29,011 75,558 139,009 243,578
11.91% 31.02% 57.07%
Middle East 20,869 50,289 67,386 138,544
15.06% 36.30% 48.64%
Africa 79,543 100,375 96,555 276,473
28.77% 36.31% 34.92%
Asia 50,463 83,709 82,076 216,248
23.34% 38.71% 37.95%
Americas 44,749 76,539 105,728 227,016
19.71% 33.72% 46.57%
Total 224,635 386,470 490,754 1,101,859
20.39% 35.07% 44.54%
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Table A3. (Continued)
 Import Data Type  
Region Missing Constructed Observed Total
Europe 53,823 41,871 201,972 297,666
18.08% 14.07% 67.85%
Middle East 20,295 8,185 37,846 66,326
30.60% 12.34% 57.06%
Africa 97,421 25,263 103,433 226,117
43.08% 11.17% 45.74%
Asia 13,724 3,362 21,210 38,296
35.84% 8.78% 55.38%
Americas 115,255 43,519 208,393 367,167
31.39% 11.85% 56.76%
Total 300,518 122,200 572,854 995,572
30.19% 12.27% 57.54%
Table A4. Gleditsch’s Analysis Predicting Onset of Militarized Interstate Disputes from 
Economic Dependence and Distance
 
Maximum Missing 
Data
Maximum Estimated 
Data
Constant 2.113 3.681(0.217) (0.219)
Trade Dependence  
  (Weak Link)
-33.600 -49.317
(9.261) (0.787)
Natural Log of Distance  
  Between Capital Cities
-0.893 -1.131
(0.029) (0.018)
N 92,096 394,057
LR χ2 (df = 2) 914.19 3799.63
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